Research

This paper makes a case for insect and AI legal personhood. Humans share the world not only with large animals like chimpanzees and elephants but also with small animals like ants and bees. In the future, we might also share the world with sentient or otherwise morally significant AI systems. These realities raise questions about what kind of legal status insects, AI systems, and other nonhumans should have in the future. At present, debates about legal personhood mostly exclude these kinds of individuals. However, this paper argues that our current framework for assessing legal personhood, coupled with our current framework for assessing risk, imply that we should treat these kinds of individuals as legal persons. It also argues that we have reason to accept this conclusion rather than alter these frameworks.

In their paper “AI Wellbeing,” Simon Goldstein and Cameron Domenico Kirk-Giannini argue that some language agents plausibly possess the capacity for wellbeing and moral standing even if they lack consciousness. My response is ambivalent. On the one hand, I am skeptical of theories of wellbeing and moral standing that lack a consciousness requirement. On the other hand, I agree with Goldstein and Kirk-Giannini (2025) that several leading theories of wellbeing and moral standing jointly imply that some language agents may be welfare subjects and moral patients and that this implication should be taken seriously. In fact, I argue that if we fully account for moral and descriptive uncertainty, we may need to lower the bar for moral standing even further, to include entities with only minimal forms of goal-orientedness or information processing. The question of whether and how to account for uncertainty might thus determine whether the arguments in “AI Wellbeing” go too far — or not far enough.

We examine how society might respond to the possibility of AI consciousness by drawing parallels with human attitudes toward animal consciousness. Our analysis reveals that perceptions of AI consciousness will likely be influenced by appearance and behavior, social and economic roles, and moral biases. However, AI systems may benefit from their advanced cognitive capacities while facing challenges due to their non-biological origins. We argue that attitudes toward AI consciousness remain malleable, making this a critical moment for research and policy development. We call for urgent interdisciplinary research on the science of AI consciousness, public attitudes about this issue, and ethical frameworks for navigating potential societal disagreement and ensuring thoughtful preparation.

This paper (co-sponsored by the Center for Mind, Ethics, and Policy; the Centre for the Governance of AI; and the Global Risk Behavioral Lab) surveys 635 AI researchers and 838 U.S. participants about the possibility of AI systems with subjective experience, as well as on the moral, legal, and political status of AI systems with subjective experience. Neither group predominantly believes such systems are imminent, but many forecast their existence within this century. Both groups support multidisciplinary expertise in assessing AI subjective experience and favor implementing safeguards now. While support for AI welfare protections was lower than for animal or environmental protection, majorities agreed that AI systems with subjective experience should act ethically and be held accountable.

This chapter examines the question of whether animals have moral rights, exploring its theoretical foundations and practical implications. Many humans acknowledge that animals matter morally, yet they often deny that animals possess rights in a robust sense. We survey key arguments for and against animal rights. We then consider which animals might have rights, which rights they might have, and how strong those rights might be. Recognizing animal rights could have far-reaching consequences for law, policy, and society. While moral and scientific uncertainty persists, we argue that this uncertainty should not prevent us from taking seriously the possibility that our current systems systematically violate animal rights and that we have an urgent responsibility to reassess and reform our treatment of other animals.

This chapter examines the moral, legal, and political standing of animals, plants, and fungi in the context of climate justice. While the intrinsic value of nonhuman animals is increasingly recognized, skepticism persists about plants and fungi. We explore recent trends in ethics and science, including the “marker method” for assessing consciousness in nonhuman animals by searching for behavioral and anatomical properties associated with conscious experience in humans. Highlighting the complexities of plant and fungal cognition, behavior, and interdependence, we argue that these beings warrant further investigation despite the methodological challenges that they raise. We also explore implications of their potential moral, legal, and political significance in a world reshaped by human activity.